




This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted following peer review 
for publication in Behavioural Public Policy. 
Sludge and Transaction Costs 
Sina Shahaba and Leonhard K. Ladesb 
aSchool of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK. Corresponding Author. 
shahabs@cardiff.ac.uk 
bEnvironmental Policy and Behavioural Science and Policy, University College Dublin, Ireland. 
 
Abstract 
Behavioural scientists have begun to research “sludge”, excessive frictions that 
make it harder for people to do what they want to do. Friction is also an important 
concept in transaction-cost economics. Nevertheless, sludge has been discussed 
without explicit referral to transaction costs. Several questions arise from this 
observation. Is the analogy to friction used differently in both literatures? If so, 
what are the key differences? If not, should we develop the concept of sludge 
when the well-established literature on transaction costs already exists? This 
conceptual paper shows that sludge and transaction costs are related, but distinct 
concepts, and that the literature on sludge can benefit from incorporating 
elements from transaction-cost research. For example, we suggest defining 
sludge as aspects of the choice architecture that lead to the experience of costs, 
organise sludges using a typology inspired by the transaction-cost literature, 
highlight specificity, uncertainty and frequency as important determinants of the 
“sludginess” of choice architecture and show that sludge audits can be conducted 
using methods developed in the transaction-cost literature. 







Behavioural insights can be used to help people achieve their long-term goals without limiting 
their freedom of choice. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call this nudging. But behavioural insights 
can also be used to make it more difficult for people to achieve their long-term goals. The phrase 
for this “dark cousin” of nudging has recently been termed as “sludge” (Sunstein, 2019b, 
Thaler, 2018). Early definitions of sludge view it as nudging for evil (Thaler, 2018),1 or as 
excessive or unjustified friction that makes it harder for people to do what they wish (Sunstein, 
2020). Sludge impedes decision making by making it more difficult for people to navigate 
through their everyday lives (Sunstein, 2019a).2  
Examples of sludge in the private and the public sector include unnecessarily complicated and 
cumbersome paperwork and form-filling requirements, hidden add-on fees, long and confusing 
fine print, unfavourable default settings, inconvenient cashback and refund conditions, 
messages that induce psychological costs in the form of negative emotions, subscription traps 
and bureaucratic red tape (Soman et al., 2019, Akerlof and Shiller, 2015, Sunstein, 2020).  
As a result of sludge, take-up of government programmes can be low, profits of firms high at 
the expense of consumer welfare, people can become frustrated, stressed and sometimes 
humiliated and exercising some basic human rights can be more difficult (Soman et al., 2019, 
 
1 We can differentiate sludge from dark nudging. The former makes good decisions more difficult (mainly by 
increasing friction) and the latter makes bad decisions easier to enact (for example, by reducing frictions) (Thaler, 
2018; Sunstein 2020; Soman et al., 2019). Sludging can also be related to ethically unacceptable goals (Lades and 
Delaney, 2020).  
2 The words “excessive” and “unjustified” are relevant in this definition. It suggests that there are many valid 
reasons for friction, including programme integrity, self-control problems, privacy, security issues, the acquisition 
of useful data (Sunstein, 2019b) and the creation of decision points (Soman et al., 2010). But these frictions are 
not sludge under this definition, as they are essential or beneficial and not excessive and harmful. Whether sludge 
is always and by definition welfare-reducing is subject to a current debate (e.g., Mills, 2020), and we will have 





Sunstein, 2019b, Thaler, 2018). Sludge can influence everybody’s decisions, but it is 
particularly powerful when humans are present-biased, overoptimistic or show other deviations 
from rationality identified in the behavioural sciences. 
While examples of sludge are abundant in the emerging discussions on the dark side of 
behavioural science, the conceptional work on sludge is in its nascent stage.3 To make progress, 
we need to define what sludge is and what it is not. We also need to identify different types of 
sludge and to establish the main factors that determine whether a process is “sludgy” or not. 
Having established such details will allow us to conduct more systematic “sludge audits” 
(Sunstein, 2020) in which different types of sludge can be identified in private and public 
institutions. In this paper, we suggest advancing the conceptual literature on sludge by 
integrating the literature on sludge (mainly discussed in the behavioural science literature) with 
the literature on “transaction costs” (mainly discussed in the new institutional economics 
literature). 
Transaction costs are typically defined as all costs involved in a transaction, other than the costs 
of physical production (Nilsson and Sundqvist, 2007, Webster and Lai, 2003).4 More 
substantially, transaction costs are the sum of the direct and indirect costs of making economic 
transactions on a market. They describe all costs that make a transaction happen but that do not 
create value (Shahab et al., 2018a, Coggan et al., 2015). They include the costs of finding 
appropriate opportunities for market transactions, exchanging and trading in the market and the 
 
3 For example, Sunstein (2020) defines sludge as excessive friction and Sunstein and Gosset (2020) investigate the 
optimal level of sludge. But if sludge is excessive (by definition), optimal sludge should be zero. In this paper, we 
understand sludge as excessive so that the optimal level of sludge is, by definition, zero. 
4 The concept of “transaction costs” was conceptually introduced by Coase (1937) to explain why firms exist. The 
concept was then further developed mainly by new institutional economics scholars (Williamson 1985, North 





costs of creating and enforcing property rights (Allen, 1999). Williamson (1985) uses the 
analogy between mechanical frictions and transaction costs. He argues that if engineers look 
for frictions in mechanical systems, economists need to take account of transaction costs. Three 
types of transaction costs are often distinguished: search and information costs, bargaining costs 
and policing/enforcement costs. Additionally, transactions costs are often linked to the creation 
and enforcement of property rights (Dahlman, 1979, Allen, 1999).5  
Both the literature on sludge and the literature on transaction costs rely on the analogy to friction 
in mechanical systems.6 However, the concept of sludge has been introduced without reference 
to transaction costs. Several questions arise from this observation: Do transaction costs and 
sludge theories analyse and explain the effects of friction on economic or policy outcomes in 
the same way? If yes, is there any need for developing a new concept such as sludge? If no, 
what are the key differences in their approaches or rationales and how can the sludge literature 
learn from over 50 years of transaction-cost research? This paper aims to answer these questions 
with the aim of developing the growing conceptual literature on sludge. 
We start by bringing together and synthesising the literature on transaction costs and the 
literature on sludge with two main objectives: (i) to identify similarities and differences across 
both areas; and (ii) to show whether/how the work on sludge can benefit from insights generated 
in transaction-cost economics. To this end, the next section shows that there is considerable 
 
5 It is worth noting that while term “transaction costs” suggests that it only applies to costs arising from a 
transaction, it is sometimes used more broadly (Buitelaar, 2004; Wang, 2003) to also include actions, as opposed 
to “trans-actions” (Commons, 1931). 
6 Friction, in the mechanical context, is the force resisting the relative motion of surfaces and material elements 
sliding against each other (Atkins and Escudier, 2013). Soman (2020) makes the analogy to friction very explicit 
when he introduces sludge by describing a metaphorical city in which some houses do not receive water from the 





overlap in the concepts and their approaches, but also highlights some key differences. We then 
describe how the literature on sludge can benefit from insights gained in transaction-cost 
research, first suggesting to define sludge as aspects of the choice architecture that lead to the 
experience of costs and discussing this definition. Second, we borrow from transaction-cost 
typologies to develop a typology of sludge that differentiates between different choice 
architectures that lead to search costs, evaluation costs, implementation costs and psychological 
costs. Third, we discuss the extent to which the main determinants of transaction costs 
(specificity, uncertainty and frequency) are also determinants of sludge. Finally, we show how 
approaches to measuring transaction costs as well as the other insights gained from the 
transaction-cost literature can inform “sludge audits”. We conclude the paper by suggesting 
avenues for future research as well as thoughts on sludge reduction in private and public 
contexts. 
Sludge and transaction costs: Similarities and differences 
This section compares the concepts of sludge and transaction costs as defined above in the 
introduction, highlighting some similarities and differences across both concepts. A complete 
description of all similarities and difference is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we hope 
to provide a useful synthesis to spark some discussion across the two literatures. We focus on 
similarities and differences with potential for transaction-cost research to inform the discussions 
of sludge, as described in the following section on Informing discussions on sludge with insights 






A key similarity across the literatures on transaction costs and sludge is that both literatures 
share the view that human behaviour is not always best described by the rational agents that 
maximise their utility under constraints as depicted in many economics textbooks. Transaction-
cost economists often cite the influence of Herbert Simon’s research on satisficing and highlight 
that people are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1997, p.xxiv). They argue 
that bounded rationality can contribute to increased transaction costs; if people were fully 
rational, less time and effort would need to be spent to allow transactions to happen.7  
The behavioural economic literature goes a step further and argues that people are not only 
boundedly rational, but also that these deviations from rational behaviour can be predicted in 
directional hypotheses (Thaler, 2015). Predictable deviations from rationality are called biases, 
and behavioural economists have identified many of these biases over the last 3 decades 
(including inertia, present bias, optimism bias, overconfidence, biased expectations, loss 
aversion and inattention to name just a few) (Dhami, 2016). It is helpful to have this view of 
human behaviour in mind when discussing the origins and consequences of transaction costs 
and sludge in the next sub-sections. 
Origins: Institutions and choice architecture 
The concept of transaction costs originates from the literature on institutions. Institutions are 
sometimes described as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990) and can lead to more or less 
 
7 However, the transaction-cost literature does not view bounded rationality as a sufficient condition for the 
existence of transaction costs. For example, if all the agents involved in a transaction were fully trustworthy, 





frictions in economically relevant transactions. On the macro level, institutional environments 
are composed of political, social and legal ground rules and these rules can slow down or speed 
up economic activities depending on their design. On the micro level, institutional arrangements 
can lead to frictions when cooperation or competition between different economic actors is 
hindered by, for example, complicated rules (Williamson, 1993).  
The term sludge originates from a literature in behavioural science that highlights the 
importance of the choice architecture as a main determinant of human behaviour. Choice 
architecture describes the contexts in which individuals make decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). These contexts can make it easy for people to make welfare-promoting decisions, for 
example when information is described in simple terms. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call 
modifications of the choice architecture that facilitate welfare-promoting choices “nudging”. 
But choice architecture can also complicate decisions, for example when the completion of 
unnecessary forms is required or when prices of consumer products are hidden and 
communicated without much transparency. In these situations, the choice architecture can be 
called “sludgy” as it creates unnecessary frictions that make it more difficult for people to make 
decisions that increase their welfare.  
Nudges that rely on changes of the choice architecture do not restrict people’s freedom to make 
decisions or change incentives significantly. Instead, these changes use psychological levers to 
make it more likely that one option is chosen over another. The importance of the choice 
architecture has been overlooked in traditional economic thinking where supposedly minor 
situational factors have been deemed irrelevant for the behaviour of the rational agents in 





economics and psychology about bounded rationality and predictable biases suggest that these 
“supposedly irrelevant factors” do matter a lot (Thaler, 2015). 
Institutions and choice architecture are not identical concepts. For example, nobody would 
deem institutions, such as property rights, marriage and religion as (supposedly) irrelevant. 
Moreover, institutions are often designed centrally, and the choice architecture is typically 
designed by street level bureaucrats or lower-level workers in organisations. However, the two 
concepts are related. When institutions are defined as the “rules of the game”, we can define 
the choice architecture as the “design of the game”.  
Consider chess as an example. The rules of the game dictate that the board is organised in 8x8 
squares, that the bishop can move diagonally and that the game is over when the king is taken. 
Within the limits provided by these rules, the game can happen in loud or quiet environments, 
different pieces can look differently, and the material of the board and the pieces can vary. 
While these design aspects might not influence the game of grandmasters, beginners might very 
well be affected, and some designs can make it harder to follow the rules than other designs.  
As such, the design, or the choice architecture, can either make it easier or more difficult to 
make decisions. Accordingly, both institutions and choice architecture influence our decisions. 
But while institutions necessarily influence everybody’s decisions, including those decisions of 
the rational agents from economics textbooks and sometimes limit freedom of choice, changes 
of the choice architecture (often in the form of changes of supposedly irrelevant factors) have 






Both institutions and the choice architecture may originate from deliberate decisions. For 
example, government officials may make it excessively difficult for people to receive welfare 
benefits and companies may make it difficult to redeem mail-in rebates to gain financial benefits 
in a somewhat opaque way. Moreover, financial adviser lobbies have an incentive to keep the 
tax system complicated to guarantee demand for their services. On the other hand, institutions 
with transaction costs as well as sludgy choice architecture can also result from unintentional 
processes where, for example, paperwork requirements accumulate over time, potentially 
because the designers of the institutions and the choice architects themselves are boundedly 
rational and not aware of the frictions they create for end-users. Public officials and industry 
representatives might not be able to see these frictions emerging as there might be an “empathy 
gap” where experts are blind to problems that non-experts might encounter (Soman et al., 2019). 
Consequences: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
Transaction costs can have many consequences. The transaction-cost literature often 
distinguishes between consequences related to reduced levels of effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity (Coggan et al., 2015, Shahab et al., 2019b, Rørstad et al., 2007, Jaraite et al., 2010, 
Kuperan et al., 2008, Shahab and Viallon, 2019, Mack et al., 2019). Transaction costs influence 
the effectiveness of market transactions when, for example, contracts are too complicated to be 
set up so that sales are not agreed upon. Thus, fewer transactions happen than it would be 
optimal. They can influence the effectiveness of government programmes when take-up rates 
of welfare benefits are low due to paperwork burdens. Transaction costs reduce efficiency 
when, for example, they lead to dead weight losses due to too little trade on a market or when 
citizens need to spend too much time and effort to receive welfare benefits. High levels of 





And transaction costs can influence how equitable outcomes of market transactions are when 
they make it easier or less costly for some than for others to make transactions. For example, 
the transaction costs of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme are lower for participants with larger 
allocations than for those with smaller allocations. While the average transaction costs for 
smaller firm is around €2.02 per tonne, larger firms pay only about €0.05 per tonne (Jaraite et 
al., 2010). 
The sludge literature has also begun to discuss consequences of sludge and we can organise 
these consequences according to their effects on effectiveness, efficiency and equity, as well. 
In terms of effectiveness in the public sector, sludge can reduce the take-up rates of government 
programmes, reduce acquisitions of permits or licenses (Herd and Moynihan, 2019) and reduce 
the ability to enjoy individual rights such as the right to vote and the right for free speech 
(Sunstein, 2020). In the private sector, sludge can reduce the number of rebates that consumers 
claim (Bar-Gill, 2012) and generally reduce people’s freedom understood as the ability to do 
what they want to do (Sunstein, 2019a). Moreover, when firms compete to design the most 
deceiving and sludgy choice architecture (rather than competing over price or quality), lower 
social welfare can be the result (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).  
In terms of efficiency, sludge in the public sector can increase the time and money spent to 
achieve given outcomes, for example when administrative requirements lead to an increased 
need for administrative capacity and person-time. In the private sector, sludge can reduce 
efficiency when goods are purchased for more than the market price.  
Finally, sludge can have uneven effects on different people, and inequality can increase when 





the sick or those with young children (Christensen et al., 2020). Those most in need of welfare 
support might also be those who have most difficulties overcoming sludge to obtain the welfare 
benefits due to low mental bandwidth and being pre-occupied with financial and other worries 
(Shafir and Mullainathan, 2013). While also fully rational people are likely to be adversely 
affected by sludge, behavioural biases make sludge especially harmful and sometimes 
devastating (Sunstein, 2019b).8  
Measurement: Direct and indirect costs 
To quantify transaction costs and consequences of sludge (also in terms of effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity), we need to identify the units in which transaction costs and the 
consequences of sludge can be measured. The transaction-cost literature quantifies transaction 
costs by measuring the direct and indirect costs incurred by involved parties to complete 
transactions (Coggan et al., 2015, Falconer and Saunders, 2002, Fang et al., 2005, Kuperan et 
al., 2008, McCann and Easter, 1999, Shahab et al., 2018a).9 The direct costs refer to all direct 
financial (or monetary) costs involved in the transactions. These costs include, for example, 
administration fees, brokerage fees, the costs of hiring consultants and intermediaries, the costs 
of transportation and accommodation and the costs of conducting surveys. The indirect costs 
often refer to the costs of time spent on each transaction. To monetise time-related costs, 
reported time inputs are multiplied by standard hourly rates.10  
 
8 Madsen, Mikkelsen, and Moynihan (2020) discuss more distributional issues related to the effects of friction as 
dealt with in the literatures on sludge, administrative burden, red tape, and ordeals. 
9 The magnitude of transaction costs varies widely from as low as 1% of the payment (Falconer and Whitby, 1999) 
to as high as 110% of the payment (Falconer and Saunders, 2002) depending on the context, the way transaction 
costs are measured and the definition of the baseline payment that defines the 100%. 
10 For example, Shahab et al (2018a) assessed the standard value of time for Maryland farmers as $22.80 per hour. 





The effects of sludge can also be measured in terms of direct costs (i.e., monetary costs in terms 
of how much money consumers/citizens lose) and indirect costs (i.e., time-related costs in terms 
of how much time consumers/citizens lose).11 Sunstein (2019b) for example suggests that about 
9.78 billion hours have been lost in the US in 2015 due to paperwork. Additionally, behavioural 
scientists highlight hedonic psychological costs (another form of indirect costs) related to 
sludge (Thunström, 2019). First studies are emerging that quantify these psychological costs of 
sludge for example using face recognition techniques (e.g., Hattke et al., 2020). While much 
more attention has been devoted to quantifying transaction costs than to the quantification of 
sludge, only few transaction costs scholars have attempted to take account of psychological 
costs when discussing transaction costs (see Hart and Moore, 2008; Hart and Holmstrom, 2010; 
Fehr et al., 2009, 2011; Bartling et al., 2017). 
Types: Search, bargaining and enforcement costs 
The transaction-cost literature has identified several types of transaction costs (Dahlman, 1979, 
McCann et al., 2005, McCann and Easter, 1999, Shahab et al., 2019a, Thompson, 1999, Bruce 
and Fabozzi, 1991). These typologies have helped transaction-cost researchers over the years 
to think systematically about transaction costs. The typologies have been instrumental 
particularly in empirical studies that aim to identify and measure transaction costs in different 
economic contexts. The literature on sludge has not yet agreed upon a typology.12 Maybe the 
 
2017), divided by the average annual hours actually worked per worker in the US in 2015, i.e. 1790 hours (OECD, 
2017). 
11 The “effects of sludge” in this sentence refer to the welfare consequences of changing the choice architecture. 
Sludges can have economic consequences in form of direct monetary costs just like nudges can make people 
financially better off. These economic costs can arise although sludges and nudges do not change economic 
incentives significantly.  
12 The first sludge typology we could identify is by Soman et al (2019) who differentiate between process sludge, 





most popular typology of transaction costs was suggested by Dahlman (1979). He differentiates 
between (i) search and information costs, (ii) bargaining and decision costs and (iii) policing 
and enforcement costs. We briefly summarise this typology here because it has inspired our 
thoughts on a sludge-typology that is presented in the sub-section Toward a typology of sludge.  
Dahlman (1979) suggests that people incur search and information costs when searching and 
collecting information before carrying out transactions. For example, consumers need to spend 
time and resources to obtain information about potential purchases (e.g., the quality of products 
and services and the trustworthiness of transaction partners), and companies need to invest time 
and resources to identify the prices they can sell their products for on the target market. 
Bargaining costs become relevant once potential transaction partners have been identified. They 
arise, for example, when interested parties attempt to assess the desire of other agents to 
participate in the transaction and to obtain information about their willingness to pay or sell. 
Such bargaining costs can arise in firm-to-firm transactions but are also relevant for transactions 
within firms and between firms and consumers. Finally, policing and enforcement costs become 
relevant when parties have come to an agreement and when this agreement needs to be enforced. 
The parties need to make sure that everybody sticks to the agreements and complies with formal 
or informal contracts. These costs can include the monitoring of outcomes and the level of 
compliance with the agreed terms and conditions, as well as the development of monitoring 
technologies. 
 
Herd, and Harvey (2015) suggest that burdens come in the form of three types of costs: learning costs describe the 
time and effort that needs to be spent to identify public services; compliance costs describe the effort and money 
that has to be spent to complete administrative requirements; and psychological costs are related to negative 
emotions such as stigma, stress and loss of autonomy that arise when people interact with the government (see 





Influencing factors: Specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
What are the factors that influence whether transaction costs and sludge are high or low? While 
the literature on sludge has not yet identified a systematic answer to this question, the 
transaction-cost literature describes various factors that influence transaction costs (Coggan et 
al., 2013, Shahab et al., 2018c, McCann, 2013). The literature has mainly focused on three 
interrelated factors influencing transaction costs: specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
(Williamson, 1985, 1996). Specificity (often referred to as asset specificity) is a “specialised 
investment that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or by alternative users without a loss 
in productive value” (Williamson, 1996, p.377). Specificity, which has various types,13 
concerns the degree to which resources are specific to particular transactions. Some resources 
can be used in many domains (e.g., money, general computer hardware or math skills) and other 
resources are not easily re-deployable to other transactions (e.g., specific software and hardware 
or tacit knowledge about how an organisation works). The more specific resources are, the 
higher are the transaction costs when these resources need to be employed in another area.  
Uncertainty can increase transaction costs when transaction partners have limited and/or 
asymmetric information about cost structures, prices and potential profits of the transactions. 
In such cases, contracts are more difficult, expensive and risky to establish (Dixit, 1996, 
Williamson, 1975, Saussier, 2000). Different aspects of uncertainty can be distinguished, for 
example in terms of volatility and ambiguity (Carson et al., 2006). Volatility concerns uncertain 
future conditions and ambiguity is about the uncertainty in present and past experiences. 
 
13 There are different types of specificity, such as the site of production, physical and dedicated assets, human 
capacity (Williamson, 1981), brand name (Williamson, 1985), time of production (Malone et al., 1987) and 





Transaction costs arise because of both forms of uncertainty and as a result of the actions that 
transactors must take to manage for these uncertainties. 
Finally, frequency is discussed in the transaction-cost literature as an influencing factor of 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are higher when transactions are infrequent than when they 
are frequent because agents become more efficient over time through a “learning by doing” 
effect (Arrow, 1962).14 Frequent transactions reduce marginal transaction costs due to the 
ability to re-deploy the collated information and capitalise on standardised processes and 
contracts. More frequent transactions of the same good or service also enable transactors to 
capitalise on economies of scale, and individuals’ past experiences with an activity can help 
them to accomplish their tasks in a more efficient way. 
Informing discussions on sludge with insights from transaction-cost economics 
A definition of sludge 
Viewing sludge through the lens of transaction-cost economics, we suggest the following 
working definition of sludge: sludge describes aspects of the choice architecture that lead to 
the experience costs.  
The costs in this definition refer to costs that need to be paid to make an action happen, but that 
might not create any value for the person who bears the costs; just like transaction costs are the 
costs that make a transaction happen, but do not create value. This definition highlights the 
 
14 There are interrelations between the three factors of specificity, uncertainty and frequency. Frequent transactions 
can reduce uncertainty over the transaction, whilst creating trust between parties involved. Likewise, asset 
specificity might impact the frequency of a transaction (Rørstad et al., 2007); a high degree of asset specificity 





connection between the literatures on sludge and transaction costs and clarifies how both terms 
are related, i.e., that sludge can lead to costs, such as transaction costs. We use the word “lead” 
intentionally here to highlight that sludge and transaction costs are not the same thing, but that 
one can lead to the other.  
The definition also captures that sludge is concerned with specific costs, namely those arising 
from aspects of the choice architecture. Other types of costs, such as brokerage 
fees/commissions, legal fees and administrative charges, do not arise due to sludge because 
they do not directly link to aspects of the choice architecture. Linking sludge to the choice 
architecture highlights the close connection between sludge and the behavioural science 
literature which suggests that human behaviour is strongly influenced by the contexts in which 
we make decisions.  
The definition suggests that sludge leads to the experience of costs. Since it is this subjective 
experience of costs that determines whether sludge is present, it is not sufficient to analyse a 
particular choice architecture to determine whether sludge is present or not (e.g., by observing 
whether there is a default, a social norm, or a lot of information presented). Additionally, one 
must observe how individuals interact with this choice architecture. This is in line with the 
literature on transaction costs that emphasises the importance of perceived, rather than 
objective, transaction costs (Mack et al., 2019, Miharia and Woltier, 2010) and the behavioural 





experience of cost (e.g., Burden et al., 2012; Christensen et al. 2020; Herd and Moynihan, 
2018).15  
The focus on subjective experience highlights that the same sludge can lead to different costs 
for different people. For example, requiring some additional paperwork to be completed can 
lead to the subjective experience of high costs for people who are currently pre-occupied with 
financial and other worries and thus are low on mental bandwidth (Shafir and Mullainathan, 
2013). Other people, who do not perceive these worries, might not experience the same high 
costs of filling out the same forms.16 Highlighting that sludge leads to experienced costs also 
suggests that sludge includes aspects of the choice architecture that create psychological costs 
such as frustration, anxiety, stigma and humiliation. Note, however, that in many situations the 
subjective experience of costs will align with objective costs, for example in terms of time, 
effort and money spent.  
Our definition of sludge also speaks to the debate on whether sludge should be defined 
normatively (sludge is always “bad”) or non-normatively (sludge can be both “good” and 
“bad”) (see Mills, 2020 arguing for a non-normative definition of nudge and sludge). Our 
definition suggests that sludge always leads to the experience of costs, and costs are always 
 
15 There are more links between the literature on sludge and the literature on public administration as reviewed by 
Madsen, Mikkelsen, and Moynihan (2020). This paper compares sludge with three other forms of friction: 
administrative burden (e.g., Burden et al, 2012), red tape (e.g., Bozeman, 2000 and Bozeman, 2012) and ordeals 
(e.g., Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982). It highlights, for example, that administrative burden is defined as a 
subjective experience (although one can use objective measures of experience to quantify it) and that sludge is 
described as objective changes in friction. We deviate from this perspective on sludge and suggest that sludge must 
lead to experienced costs to be defined as sludge. The paper by Madsen, Mikkelsen, and Moynihan (2020) 
additionally discusses distributiveness, the object and the domain of frictions, and intentionality as other 
dimensions on which sludge can be compared with administrative burden, red tape and ordeals.  
16 The subjective element of costs experienced by the decision maker in our definition links to the “as judged by 
themselves” criterion that Thaler and Sunstein (2008) use to determine whether nudges are libertarian paternalistic 





welfare-reducing. However, it might very well be the case that the same sludge also leads to 
benefits for the individual, for the choice architect or for society as a whole (for example as 
discussed in the context of self-control problems by Soman (2010) and program integrity by 
Sunstein and Gosset, 2020). But whether sludge leads to net-benefits or net-costs all aspects 
considered is irrelevant for our definition of sludge. Observing that a person experiences costs 
that are due to the choice architecture the person navigates in is enough for us to claim that we 
have identified sludge, independent of whether the sludge also leads to benefits. As such, we 
suggest that sludge always leads to costs, but determining whether sludge is welfare-reducing 
(i.e., unjustified and excessive) or welfare-enhancing requires a broader cost-benefit analysis 
that also integrates benefits to all involved parties (see also Linos et al., 2020).17 
Toward a typology of sludge 
The universe of sludging is large and there are many types of sludges (e.g., unnecessary 
paperwork, difficulties to opt out of newspaper subscriptions and unnecessary waiting periods). 
A systematic classification of these types of sludge would be beneficial. For example, it would 
help to develop scorecards that individuals and institutions can use to identify sludge (Soman 
et al., 2019).18 It would also assist in bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical studies 
 
17 As discussed in Madsen, Mikkelsen, and Moynihan (2020), some sub-fields in the public administration 
literature suggest that frictions can be overall welfare-enhancing (e.g., when administration is onerous but also 
useful to identify whether somebody is eligible for a service). Other sub-literatures in that field suggest that 
frictions are always welfare-reducing (e.g., some definitions of red tape assume that there are no benefits to red 
tape). 
18 Soman et al. (2019) argue that a given choice architecture can be sludgy for some individuals but not for others. 
They argue that it can be difficult for choice architects (who are experts in their area) to emphasise with non-
experts who experience sludge with detrimental outcomes. Experts can easily navigate through even complex 
choice architectures and thus might have difficulties identifying the effect of sludge on non-experts’ behaviour. A 





on sludge, particularly regarding sludge audits, and prevent overlooking important types of 
sludge in these audits. Hence, we suggest a sludge typology in this sub-section.  
Since our definition of sludge connects sludge to the transaction-cost literature, relying on 
Dahlman’s (1979) typology for transaction costs (described in the sub-section Types) is a good 
starting point to develop a sludge typology. However, Dahlman’s typology is most adequate to 
describe transaction costs that arise in market transactions, and sludge is also present in other 
situations, for example within organisations and institutions and when citizens interact with the 
government. Hence, we modify the typology by using broader terms that can describe most 
examples of sludge currently discussed in the literature. More precisely, and in line with 
Dahlman’s three types of transaction costs, we differentiate between sludge as aspects of the 
choice architecture that lead to the experience of (i) search costs, (ii) evaluation costs and (iii) 
implementation costs.19 We also add a fourth type of cost to account for the emotional 
consequences of sludge: (iv) the experience of psychological costs. Below and in Table 1, we 
explain this typology and use it to organise some of the emerging behavioural science literature 
on sludge, also from behavioural industrial organisation (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015, Heidhues 
and Kőszegi, 2018, Bar-Gill, 2012, Grubb, 2015a). We thus demonstrate that, while there is 
overlap between the types, many sludges can indeed be organised into one of these four types.  
 
19 Sludge is particularly relevant when individuals interact with non-human systems such as websites, booking 
systems and generally in online environments (Costa and Halpern, 2019). Since the term bargaining does not 
capture all these transactions as it implies active participation of both bargaining partners, we use the term 
evaluation costs to describe costs arising from choice architecture that makes it more difficult for people to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of an action. Evaluation costs include bargaining costs (or the evaluation of the willingness 
of the potential transaction partners to pay or sell products), but evaluation costs are not limited to bargaining costs. 
Similarly, implementation costs, as we use the term, are broader than policing and enforcement costs. They include 
the implementation of agreements between different parties, but also include the costs of sticking to plans people 






Sludge can increase search costs when aspects of the choice architecture make it more difficult 
for people to find the relevant information needed for good decision making. For example, 
presenting too much information can decrease the motivation to choose or the satisfaction with 
the finally chosen option (Grubb, 2015b, Scheibehenne et al., 2010). The order in which 
information is presented can also increase search costs, for example when initially low prices 
increase throughout the purchasing process (Gabaix et al., 2006). A product might be listed at 
a very low price but additional shipping and handling costs or essential “extras” can increase 
this price above that of competitors, a characteristic sometimes referred to as “shrouded 
attributes” (Ellison and Ellison, 2009, Gabaix et al., 2006). Generally, the choice architecture 
can determine whether prices and other product attributes are immediately visible and salient 
or hidden from sight, which influences how easy or difficult it is to find the relevant 
information. Moreover, the choice architecture can orient people’s attention to one area of the 
product over another potentially more important dimension (Bar-Gill, 2019, Ubel et al., 2015). 
In the context of interactions between the government and citizens, sludge can lead to search 
costs when websites are so complicated that it is difficult for citizens to become aware of their 
eligibility for welfare benefits, tax reductions or other government benefits (Herd and 
Moynihan, 2019).  
Evaluation costs: 
Sludge can increase evaluation costs when the choice architecture makes it more difficult to 
evaluate advantages and disadvantages of different options. In many cases, this creates 





communicate product features, contract terms and prices can make consumers overestimate 
benefits and underestimate prices of products such as credit cards, mobile phone contracts and 
mortgages (Bar-Gill, 2012). Moreover, predicting how consumers will use products in the 
future is inherently difficult, and firms can make use of this by hiding overdraft fees and credit 
limits in the fine print. For example, mobile phone and credit card contracts are often designed 
to make the evaluation of their actual prices difficult: Salient up-front costs are reduced and the 
less salient, hidden costs such as overdraft fees, are increased. Shrouded attributes do not only 
increase search costs as described in the previous sub-section; they can also make it more 
difficult to evaluate the costs and benefits of different options.  
Implementation costs: 
Sludge can lead to higher implementation costs when the choice architecture makes it more 
difficult for people to get what they want and avoid what they do not want. For example, after 
people have evaluated the costs and benefits of receiving a monthly service and decided to 
cancel the service, they must implement that decision. Sludge can make this implementation 
very difficult when the cancellation process is made complicated and long (Norwegian 
Consumer Council, 2021). Similarly, excessive paperwork and form filing requirements can 
make it more difficult for people to participate in government programs, for example when 
information needs to be provided multiple times, when one’s status needs to be certified 
although the government is the certifying institution, when submissions are required to be sent 
by postal mail rather than digitally or when people are required to actively renew their 
participation in welfare programmes (Herd and Moynihan, 2019). As many researchers will 





requirements in one’s institution and these differences can be described as implementation 
costs.  
Psychological costs: 
The literature on sludge frequently refers to psychological costs (Sunstein, 2020).20 For 
example, Hattke et al. (2020) show in a laboratory experiment that bureaucratic red tape creates 
negative emotional responses as measured using facial recognition technology. Other examples 
of psychological costs of sludge include the stress in dealing with unnecessary frictions with 
the underlying worry of the risk of losing important benefits, embarrassment that might arise 
when people need to apply for welfare benefits, self-image concerns related to the requirement 
to tell others how miserable one is to get welfare benefits, the stigma of participating in 
programmes, loss of personal autonomy, a sense of unfairness and animosity among public 
servants who administer programs (Herd and Moynihan, 2019). For choice architects it can be 
difficult to anticipate these psychological effects of sludge because the designers of the choice 
architecture may not have experienced these emotions first-hand. Hence, the empathy gap 
between the choice architect and the end user is likely strongest when it comes to psychological 
costs (Soman et al., 2019).  
 
 
20 Here (and in other instances) the literature on sludge cites insights from the administrative burden literature 





Table 1 A typology of four different types of sludges leading to different experienced costs  
Type of cost Definition Examples 
Search costs 
Aspects of the choice 
architecture that lead to the 
experience of search costs by 
making it more difficult to 
acquire relevant information 
about different options.
Offering too many options; 
Confusopolies; Ordering of search 




Aspects of the choice 
architecture that lead to the 
experience of evaluation costs 
by making it more difficult to 
evaluate advantages and 
disadvantages of different 
options.  
Hidden add-on costs and drip pricing; 
Hidden extra fees; Untrue discount 
claims and moon pricing; Long and 
confusing fine print. 
Implementation 
costs 
Aspects of the choice 
architecture that lead to the 
experience of implementation 
costs by making it more difficult 
to get what you want and avoid 
what you do not want.
Hidden subscriptions; Automatically 
renewing subscription; Unnecessarily 
complex paperwork; Difficult return 
policies; Complicated tax filing.  
Psychological 
costs 
Aspects of the choice 
architecture that lead to the 
experience of psychological 
costs by creating negative 
experiences such as stress, 
stigma, disempowerment and 
loss of autonomy. 
Misleading messages that put 
psychological pressure on buyers to 
purchase; Misleadingly highlighting the 
popularity of a product; False scarcity 
messages; Pressure selling.  
 
Factors influencing sludge 
As summarised in section Influencing factors, the transaction-cost literature suggests that, inter 
alia, specificity, uncertainty and frequency influence how low or high transaction costs are. 
These three factors are also important determinants of whether a choice architecture is sludgy 
or not. First, a highly specific choice architecture can make a change of setting more costly. For 
example, people may have developed the skills to navigate through the choice architecture of a 





people need to navigate through a different choice architecture that can be complex to navigate 
in at the start. If that is the case, specificity of the choice architecture can be a form of sludge 
as it creates implementation costs related to the move from one organisation to another. 
Second, when a person experiences costs due to a choice architecture that creates uncertainty, 
sludge can be present. For example, some firms seem to try to reduce cancellations of their 
services by warning users of the consequences of unsubscribing without clarifying what these 
consequences are. Similarly, users willing to cancel subscriptions are sometimes asked multiple 
times to affirm their choice using different words which can create uncertainty about one’s 
motivation to cancel (Norwegian Consumer Council, 2021). Uncertainty can also make the 
choice architecture sludgy when multiple steps are required in administrative or other processes 
and when individuals are not made aware of these steps at the beginning of the process. People 
may also experience costs when the timing of a service, such as the arrival of a taxi or the 
delivery of a postal parcel, is uncertain. These are examples where the choice architecture 
creates uncertainty in individuals and thus makes them experience search, evaluation, 
implementation and psychological costs. 
Finally, the extent of sludge in a choice architecture can also be influenced by the frequency of 
navigation in this choice architecture. When people first encounter a new choice architecture, 
they often experience high costs. However, once people have learned to navigate in this choice 
architecture, it becomes less sludgy for them as they experience less search, evaluation, 
implementation and psychological costs over time. A choice architecture can be particularly 
sludgy when people encounter the choice architecture only infrequently (for example, once a 
year for the tax returns). Such infrequent requirements to navigate through a largely unchanging 





choice architectures by re-using collected information and re-deploying resources again and 
again. This allows them to become helpful guides in choice architectures that appear complex 
and alien to most people. 
Sludge audits 
Arguably the main reasons to better understand sludge are to be able to identify it, to conjecture 
about its welfare consequences and to develop ways to reduce sludge if deemed necessary 
(Soman et al., 2019, Sunstein, 2019b). To identify sludge as a first step in this process, Sunstein 
(2020) suggests using “sludge audits.” He argues that private and public organisations can 
engage in annual sludge audits to identify where and when sludge exists and whether it needs 
to be reduced. Periodic lookbacks at existing sludge can be conducted to identify the current 
stock of unnecessary requirements posed to employees and civil servants as well as customers 
and citizens. To measure sludge, he differentiates between time-related costs, financial costs 
and psychological costs (see also sub-section Measurement: Direct and indirect costs). When 
conducting sludge audits, Sunstein argues, cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses should 
be considered,21 and a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches should be used to look at 
sludge on a case-by-case basis (Sunstein, 2020).  
The insights from the transaction-cost literature, some of them presented in the previous 
sections of this paper, may provide additional guidance on how to design sludge audits. 
Transaction-cost economics has developed a large body of literature that addresses questions 
on how to measure transaction costs in theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions 
 
21 Cost-benefit analyses may often be impossible in the context of the quantification of sludge. Sunstein (2020) 
suggests that an alternative to the cost benefit analysis is to make assessments of proportionality, asking whether 





(Shahab et al., 2018a, McCann and Easter, 1999, Coggan et al., 2015, McCann et al., 2005, 
Jaraite et al., 2010). Referring to this literature and the previous insights presented in this paper, 
in what follows we present five crucial aspects to be considered when conducting sludge audits: 
(i) breaking up the processes into required actions, (ii) choosing the appropriate methods, (iii) 
recruiting the relevant participants, (iv) asking the right questions and (v) communicating the 
benefits of sludge audits. 
Breaking up the processes into required actions: 
Most sludge audits will proceed in at least two steps. The first step is to break up more 
complicated processes into smaller sub-processes. This is essential to keep the audit 
manageable and to identify the specific interventions that can reduce sludge in certain 
situations. A potential problem arises in this process as, theoretically, each sub-process could 
be further divided into more and more sub-sub-processes (Shahab et al., 2018b, Tan et al., 
2012). To avoid endless divisions into smaller processes, a basic unit of analysis needs to be 
identified. In the transaction-cost literature, the basic unit of analysis is the transaction 
(Williamson, 1998), defined as the transfer of property rights regarding goods, services, 
information, knowledge or ideas (Williamson, 1996). For sludge audits, we suggest using the 
“required action” as the basic unit of analysis. The required action would be defined as each 
step that has to be taken in a decision-making process to achieve one’s goal as subjectively 
defined by the individual. The concept of the required action is somewhat broader than the 
concept of the “trans-action”, because sludge can also be present when only a single individual 
makes a decision and no other people are involved who could be the receiver of a transaction. 
Practically, sludge auditors can ask relevant interview/survey participants to describe the 





down the process into the different actions required. In the second step, a sludge auditor would 
then analyse each required action using methods/questions as presented in the next sub-sections. 
Choosing the appropriate method: 
The transaction-cost literature uses various approaches to measure transaction costs. For 
example, McCann et al. (2005) identify five different sources of information for measuring 
transaction costs: (i) interviews or surveys of people and parties involved in transactions, (ii) 
secondary data from other studies, (iii) government reports, (iv) financial reports and (v) 
proposed budgets. However, the most common way to collect data about the size of transaction 
costs is to use surveys and/or interviews (see for example Falconer and Saunders, 2002, Shahab 
et al., 2018a, Fang et al., 2005, Kuperan et al., 2008, Ofei-Mensah and Bennett, 2013). The 
main reason for the use of interviews and surveys is that other methods and data sources are not 
always available to obtain information regarding both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs 
(McCann et al., 2005). As such, the most common methods to conduct sludge audits will likely 
be interviews and surveys as well. Moreover, to start the sludge audit, it is advisable for auditors 
to go through the process themselves, if possible, attempting to gain a first-hand experience. To 
bridge the “empathy gap” (Soman et al., 2019), auditors can alternatively ask a non-expert to 
go through the process. Additional methods, such as face recognition experiments to measure 
psychological costs (Hattke et al., 2020), are likely to become more common over time.  
Recruiting the relevant participants: 
If sludge auditors decide to use interviews and/or surveys to collect data regarding each of the 
required actions, the next step will be to recruit the relevant participants. Some studies in the 





defining the population of interest, (ii) deciding on a sample size and (iii) selecting a sampling 
strategy. The population of interest would be a set of all people who are eligible to be 
interviewed/surveyed in a sludge audit. To define the population of interest, either inclusion 
(i.e., everyone who has a specific characteristic) or exclusion (i.e., everyone who does not have 
the specific characteristic) criteria can be used. It is important to include individuals who do 
navigate in the respective choice architecture to gain insights into experienced costs from those 
who experience these costs in real life as well. Deciding on the size of the sample of participants 
depends on the chosen method. In quantitative surveys, the sample size needs to allow for 
statistical generalisability and power analyses can be helpful. In qualitative interviews, the aim 
is to reach data saturation, which describes the point at which no new additional data or no 
further insights are generated from data collection (Guest et al., 2006). Finally, regarding the 
sampling strategy, the auditors can choose between different types of purposive and/or random 
sampling strategies, depending on the main objectives of the audit and the chosen method. 
Asking the right questions: 
The second step in most sludge audits will aim to identify sludge related to each of the required 
actions. To identify valid topics to discuss and questions to ask, it can be helpful to refer to the 
definition of sludge, the sludge typology and the influencing factors that we have described 
above. For example, a good start is to ask participants to indicate whether they experienced 
costs in the process of enacting the required action. It is worth noting that these costs can be 
financial (direct costs) or related to lost time or psychological burden (indirect costs). Follow-
up questions can then ask whether participants experienced specific types of costs (i.e., search 
costs, evaluation costs, implementation costs and psychological costs). For example, questions 





advantages and disadvantages of options and to get what they wanted and avoid what they did 
not want can be asked. Similarly, sludge auditors can directly ask about negative experiences 
such as stress, stigma, disempowerment and loss of autonomy.  
Once these different costs have been identified, sludge auditors can ask participants to reflect 
on the sources of these costs, highlighting supposedly irrelevant factors related to the choice 
architecture. In particularly, sludge auditors can invite participants to reflect on the specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency of the choice situation. It may be helpful, for example, to ask 
participants whether they are able to transfer knowledge from one experience to the next, 
whether they experience uncertainty and are not sure about the right steps in the process and 
whether the process would get less costly each time they go repeat it. 
Communicating the benefits of sludge audits: 
For sludge audits to happen, it is essential to get some buy-in from the relevant actors in industry 
or policy. To obtain this buy-in, it is important to clearly demonstrate the relevance of thinking 
about the choice architecture and design aspects, rather than thinking only about institutional 
rules. It can be helpful to communicate some key insights from the behavioural sciences about 
predictable decision-making biases and the related importance of context effects to highlight 
why it is important to also consider the choice architecture. Moreover, potential auditors might 
be experts in the choice architecture that might benefit from a sludge audit. This can lead to an 
empathy gap, making it difficult for the experts to “see sludge” (Soman et al., 2019). Hence it 
is important to highlight the subjective nature of sludge; that what is sludge for one person is 
not sludge for another person. It can also be helpful to stress that sludge can grow through 





the existing sludge. Finally, it might be better to avoid using negative language. Both the words 
“sludge” and “audit” may be perceived as threatening and public officials as well as industry 
representative may be more open to “behavioural process reviews”, “tests for regulatory load” 
or “transaction costs measurement” than for “sludge audits”. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This conceptual paper shows that sludge and transaction costs are related, but distinct concepts. 
The two concepts are related because sludge can lead to the experience of costs. The two 
concepts are distinct because sludge can lead to the experience of various types of costs and not 
only transaction costs. The paper suggests that the behavioural science literature on sludge can 
benefit from incorporating concepts and methods developed in the new institutional economics 
literature on transaction costs. First, it suggests defining sludge as aspects of the choice 
architecture that lead to experienced costs. Second, it presents a new typology of sludge that 
differentiates between aspects of the choice architecture that lead to the experience of (i) search 
costs, (ii) evaluation costs, (iii) implementation costs and (iv) psychological costs. Third, the 
paper shows that specificity, uncertainty and frequency are factors that influence transaction 
costs as well as how sludgy a choice architecture is. Finally, building on the discussed 
contributions, the paper presents some pragmatic considerations for conducting sludge audits.  
Once sludge audits have been conducted, the next step is to reduce the previously identified 
sludge where adequate. While “sludge reduction” is beyond the scope of the current paper (see 
Sunstein 2019 for a discussion on sludge-reduction), we do provide an outlook on future work 
on this topic. First, our definition of sludge suggests that sludge reduction refers to changes in 





evaluation costs, implementation costs and psychological costs. Sludge reduction policies 
might well differ depending on the type of sludge. Second, while we have focussed on changing 
the choice architecture in this paper, our definition of sludge also allows an alternative avenue 
of sludge reduction: It is possible to educate people to be aware of sludge in its different facets 
and to help them navigate through the choice architecture efficiently. Such educational 
strategies could be considered a specific form of “boosting” (e.g., Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig, 
2016). In fact, merely providing a language to describe the hassle related of administrative 
burdens and other frictions of everyday life might already be enough for self-reflective 
individuals to experience less costs when navigating through complex choice architecture. 
Third, sludge is often reduced by private agents when intermediaries (for example, consultants, 
lawyers and the tax preparation industry) take care of our paperwork for us. Finally, when 
sludge is intentional, governments may also consider mandating sludge reductions and thus 
engage in specific forms of “budging”, i.e. the governments’ uses of behavioural economic 
findings to inform where and how to regulate the private sector (Oliver, 2013). 
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